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1. Introduction      
The Network security aims to protect the network and the network-accessible resources from 
unauthorized access. However, the dynamic characteristics of contemporary networks 
combined with their increased size makes the vision of absolute network security almost 
impossible. Specifically, networks are vulnerable to infection by different types of electronic 
attacks such as viruses, Trojan horses or eavesdroppers that exploits the loopholes in the 
security mechanisms of networks [FAGY00]. Guaranteeing an acceptable level of security 
for a prospective system represents a common problem in systems engineering. Network 
security, is defined as a Non-Functional Requirement (NFR) that is influenced by functional 
aspects of the system such as the specification of antivirus and firewall mechanism 
employed on the network. This area of research has gained considerable popularity due to 
the implications it has on users’ satisfaction, business reputation and performance. 
Therefore, being able to quantify the security level of a future network early in the design 
phase is of vital importance to its sustainability. The need to validate security requirements 
early has been addressed also by Lamsweerde [CILN02] and Crook [L04]. 
 
Unlike functional requirements, which can be deterministically validated, NFRs are soft 
variables that cannot be implemented directly; instead, they are satisfied by a combination 
of functional requirements. NFRs define the overall qualities or attributes of the resulting 
system and as such place restrictions on the software product being developed. Examples of 
NFR include safety, security, usability, reliability and performance requirements. Typical 
approaches to validating NFRs include, formal methods, prototypes, system simulations 
[AG05] and use of scenarios.  
 
Model-checking techniques have been used extensively to verify and validate requirements. 
However, when its comes to NFR model checking is not adequate. Scenario-based 
requirements analysis methods, pioneered by Potts [P99] , Potts and Anton [P98], and Potts 
et al [P94], proposed that obstacles or difficulties which might prevent a goal being achieved 
should challenge requirements and, hence, promote refinement of the requirements 
specification to deal with such obstacles. This approach was developed by van Lamsweerde 
[L01] and van Lamsweerde and Letier [L00] , who applied formal reasoning to requirements 
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specifications to infer whether goals could or could not be achieved given constraints 
imposed by obstacles. Hierarchical goal decomposition produced specifications of the states 
to be achieved and the system behavior required to reach those states, so considerable 
problem refinement was necessary before automated reasoning could be applied. These 
approaches also assumed that a limited number of scenarios and their inherent obstacles are 
tested. This raises the question of test data coverage, i.e., just what is a sufficient set of 
scenarios to enable validation to be completed with confidence? While we believe there is no 
quick answer to this vexing problem, one approach is to reduce the set of scenarios that 
needs to be tested to achieve adequate validation.  
 
This chapter addresses the aforementioned problem of generating large numbers of test 
scenarios during a typical scenario-based requirements validation process through Game 
Theory. Specifically, we reduce the complexity of the solution space to a manageable set by 
focusing only on combinations of strategies that satisfy the both defenders and attackers of a 
network. In this work, we apply game theory to assess the security NFR of a prospective 
network prior to its implementation and as such provide a validation of the security NFR. 
The assessed security NFR represents the minimum level of security guarantee for a 
prospective network, given a number of immunity requirements to be implemented in the 
network. These requirements correspond to antivirus software and their location on the 
network. Specifically, in the problem scenario we address in this chapter we assume that a 
number of harmful entities or attackers (or an upper bound of this number) may hit 
anywhere in the network. Attacks target nodes of the network. When, there is no 
information on how the attackers are placed on the network nodes, one may assume that 
they follow a uniform distribution. The immunity functional requirements of the network 
describe its defence mechanisms and are expressed by a set of defenders; software security 
systems that should guarantee an acceptable level of security to a part of the network (a link, 
a path, or a subnetwork). Attackers damage targeted nodes unless these are guarded by a 
defence software. Lamsweerde in [L04] also refers to the need to analyze the rational of the 
attacker in an attempt to become proactive rather than reactive in network security 
management. Lamsweerde refers to anti goals and anti requirements that define the 
attacker’s strategies based on which the network designers specified functional 
requirements to tackle these.  
 
1.1 Network Security NFR 
Network Security is considered an important non-functional requirement needed to be 
guaranteed in a prospective computer network. Thus, it should be validated early in the 
design phase. Maintaining acceptable level of security in a network is analogous to 
preventing attacks on a country by deploying appropriate defences. Network security NFR 
corresponds to the ability of a network to successfully prevent attackers from maliciously 
exploiting its' information technology resources. With adequate security, attacks could be 
stopped at their entry points before they spread into the network. This requirement 
however, is impossible to achieve most of the times, due to the level of complexity, size and 
dynamic nature of contemporary computer networks. As a result designers seek to identify 
the best network configuration given the desire security level to be achieved using different 
configurations of immunity requirements. 
 
 
Recent work by [KO04, ACY05] and [MPPS05b, MPPS05c], initiated the introduction of 
strategic games on graphs (and the study of their associated Nash equilibria) as a means of 
studying security problems in networks with selfish entities. By selfish we mean that each 
entity in the game aims to maximize its utility. In the security games studied in [KO04], a 
large number of players must make individual decisions related to security. The ultimate 
safety of each player may depend in a complex way on the actions of the entire population.  
[MPPS05b, MPPS05c] considers a security problem on a distributed network modeled as a 
multi-player non-cooperative game with attackers (e.g., viruses) and a defender (e.g., a 
security software) entities. More specifically, there are two classes of confronting 
randomized players on a graph:  attackers, each choosing vertices and wishing to minimize 
the probability of being caught, and a single defender, who chooses edges and gains the 
expected number of attackers it kills. A subsequent work [MMPPS06] introduced the Price of 
Defense in order to evaluate the loss in the provided security guarantees due to the selfish 
nature of attacks and defenses. This notion can be also seen as a (negative) measurement of 
the network security. A collection of polynomial computable Nash equilibria with guarantee 
defense ratio (i.e. security level) is presented.  
 
1.2 Road Map 
The paper is organised as follows. Firstly, we illustrate the principles of game theory, 
followed with a description of the approach. The important question that arises here is the 
following: '' Given the limited capabilities of the system security software, which part of the 
network should it choose to clean or protect from possible attack, so that the security level 
achieved is at least equal to the required level specified by the network designer?''   
 
2. Game Theory 
Game Theory is a branch of applied mathematics that attempts to analytically model the 
rational behavior of intelligent agents in strategic situations, in which an individual's 
success depends on the decisions of others. While initially developed to analyze 
competitions in which one individual does better at another's expense, it evolved into  
techniques for modeling a wide class of interactions, characterized by multiple criteria. 
 
Most of the existing and foreseen complex networks, such as the Internet, are operated and 
built by thousands of large and small entities (autonomous agents), which collaborate to 
process and deliver end-to-end flows originating from and terminating at any of them. 
Recently, Game Theory has been proven to be a powerful modeling tool to describe such 
selfish, rational and at the same time, decentralized interactions [C01, O94]. In particular, 
Game Theory was successfully utilized for analyzing and most importantly evaluating the 
performance of existing networks in various aspects. Examples of such performance aspects 
include makespan, throughput, latency, resource utilization, users’ satisfaction as well as 
security guarantees [R05, R02, ACY05, ADTW03, KP99, T04]. At the same time, a significant 
branch of Game Theory, Mechanism Design [NR99] is used to design future networks given a 
number of functional requirements specifications.  
  
Game Theory has been used to understand selfish rational behaviour of complex networks, 
e.g. the Internet, of many “agents” (consisting the players of the game). In such domains, 
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specifications to infer whether goals could or could not be achieved given constraints 
imposed by obstacles. Hierarchical goal decomposition produced specifications of the states 
to be achieved and the system behavior required to reach those states, so considerable 
problem refinement was necessary before automated reasoning could be applied. These 
approaches also assumed that a limited number of scenarios and their inherent obstacles are 
tested. This raises the question of test data coverage, i.e., just what is a sufficient set of 
scenarios to enable validation to be completed with confidence? While we believe there is no 
quick answer to this vexing problem, one approach is to reduce the set of scenarios that 
needs to be tested to achieve adequate validation.  
 
This chapter addresses the aforementioned problem of generating large numbers of test 
scenarios during a typical scenario-based requirements validation process through Game 
Theory. Specifically, we reduce the complexity of the solution space to a manageable set by 
focusing only on combinations of strategies that satisfy the both defenders and attackers of a 
network. In this work, we apply game theory to assess the security NFR of a prospective 
network prior to its implementation and as such provide a validation of the security NFR. 
The assessed security NFR represents the minimum level of security guarantee for a 
prospective network, given a number of immunity requirements to be implemented in the 
network. These requirements correspond to antivirus software and their location on the 
network. Specifically, in the problem scenario we address in this chapter we assume that a 
number of harmful entities or attackers (or an upper bound of this number) may hit 
anywhere in the network. Attacks target nodes of the network. When, there is no 
information on how the attackers are placed on the network nodes, one may assume that 
they follow a uniform distribution. The immunity functional requirements of the network 
describe its defence mechanisms and are expressed by a set of defenders; software security 
systems that should guarantee an acceptable level of security to a part of the network (a link, 
a path, or a subnetwork). Attackers damage targeted nodes unless these are guarded by a 
defence software. Lamsweerde in [L04] also refers to the need to analyze the rational of the 
attacker in an attempt to become proactive rather than reactive in network security 
management. Lamsweerde refers to anti goals and anti requirements that define the 
attacker’s strategies based on which the network designers specified functional 
requirements to tackle these.  
 
1.1 Network Security NFR 
Network Security is considered an important non-functional requirement needed to be 
guaranteed in a prospective computer network. Thus, it should be validated early in the 
design phase. Maintaining acceptable level of security in a network is analogous to 
preventing attacks on a country by deploying appropriate defences. Network security NFR 
corresponds to the ability of a network to successfully prevent attackers from maliciously 
exploiting its' information technology resources. With adequate security, attacks could be 
stopped at their entry points before they spread into the network. This requirement 
however, is impossible to achieve most of the times, due to the level of complexity, size and 
dynamic nature of contemporary computer networks. As a result designers seek to identify 
the best network configuration given the desire security level to be achieved using different 
configurations of immunity requirements. 
 
 
Recent work by [KO04, ACY05] and [MPPS05b, MPPS05c], initiated the introduction of 
strategic games on graphs (and the study of their associated Nash equilibria) as a means of 
studying security problems in networks with selfish entities. By selfish we mean that each 
entity in the game aims to maximize its utility. In the security games studied in [KO04], a 
large number of players must make individual decisions related to security. The ultimate 
safety of each player may depend in a complex way on the actions of the entire population.  
[MPPS05b, MPPS05c] considers a security problem on a distributed network modeled as a 
multi-player non-cooperative game with attackers (e.g., viruses) and a defender (e.g., a 
security software) entities. More specifically, there are two classes of confronting 
randomized players on a graph:  attackers, each choosing vertices and wishing to minimize 
the probability of being caught, and a single defender, who chooses edges and gains the 
expected number of attackers it kills. A subsequent work [MMPPS06] introduced the Price of 
Defense in order to evaluate the loss in the provided security guarantees due to the selfish 
nature of attacks and defenses. This notion can be also seen as a (negative) measurement of 
the network security. A collection of polynomial computable Nash equilibria with guarantee 
defense ratio (i.e. security level) is presented.  
 
1.2 Road Map 
The paper is organised as follows. Firstly, we illustrate the principles of game theory, 
followed with a description of the approach. The important question that arises here is the 
following: '' Given the limited capabilities of the system security software, which part of the 
network should it choose to clean or protect from possible attack, so that the security level 
achieved is at least equal to the required level specified by the network designer?''   
 
2. Game Theory 
Game Theory is a branch of applied mathematics that attempts to analytically model the 
rational behavior of intelligent agents in strategic situations, in which an individual's 
success depends on the decisions of others. While initially developed to analyze 
competitions in which one individual does better at another's expense, it evolved into  
techniques for modeling a wide class of interactions, characterized by multiple criteria. 
 
Most of the existing and foreseen complex networks, such as the Internet, are operated and 
built by thousands of large and small entities (autonomous agents), which collaborate to 
process and deliver end-to-end flows originating from and terminating at any of them. 
Recently, Game Theory has been proven to be a powerful modeling tool to describe such 
selfish, rational and at the same time, decentralized interactions [C01, O94]. In particular, 
Game Theory was successfully utilized for analyzing and most importantly evaluating the 
performance of existing networks in various aspects. Examples of such performance aspects 
include makespan, throughput, latency, resource utilization, users’ satisfaction as well as 
security guarantees [R05, R02, ACY05, ADTW03, KP99, T04]. At the same time, a significant 
branch of Game Theory, Mechanism Design [NR99] is used to design future networks given a 
number of functional requirements specifications.  
  
Game Theory has been used to understand selfish rational behaviour of complex networks, 
e.g. the Internet, of many “agents” (consisting the players of the game). In such domains, 
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Game Theory models players with potentially different goals (utility functions or payoffs), 
that participate under a common setting with well prescribed interactions (strategies), e.g. 
TCP/IP protocols. More importantly, it helps finding the best strategy of each player that will 
guarantee the best result. The core concept of Game Theory is the notion of equilibrium that 
is defined as the condition of a system in which competing influences are balanced.  
 
2.1 Fundamental Components of Game Theory 
The fundamental component of game theory is the notion of a game, expressed in normal 
form as G=( M, A, {ui}), where G is a particular game, M is a finite set of players (decision 
makers) {1,2,…,m}, Ai is the set of actions available to player i, A = A1  A2   Am is the 
action space, and {ui} ={ u1 , u2 , ui , um } is the set of objective functions that the players wish 
to maximize. For every player i, the objective function, ui, is a function of the particular 
action chosen by player i, ai, and the particular actions chosen by all of the other players in 
the game, a-i.  
 
A profile or strategy of a game σ is defined as the a setting of its players in term of possible 
actions or the probability distribution on a set of actions for each player of the game in 
setting σ. The action of player i  M is denoted by σi, where σi  Ai.  
 
The core concept of Game Theory is the notion of equilibrium that is defined as the 
condition of a system in which competing influences are balanced, i.e. steady-state 
conditions. More informally, in any game, a profile σ is a Nash equilibrium [Nash50, Nash51] 
if in σ no player would unilaterally choose to deviate from his chosen action as this would 
diminish his payoff. Intuitively speaking, Nash equilibria model well stables states of a 
network, since if the network reaches such a configuration, most probably it would remain 
in the same configuration, since none of the involving entities has a motivation to change his 
status in order to be more satisfied. Thus, identifying Nash equilibria configuration of a 
network and evaluating them has been the main approach in order to analyze, evaluate 
networks performance [ACY05, ADTW03 , CK05, KP99, MMP08, RT02].  
 
Summing up, Game Theory and its various concepts of equilibrium provide a rich 
framework for modeling the behavior of selfish agents in distributed or networked 
environments. Moreover, it offers mechanisms to achieve efficient and desirable global 
outcomes given the selfish behavior of agents.  
 
2.2. An Example Game: The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma [O94] game has two players (the prisoners): Bob and Al. Each of 
them has two possible strategies: to confess the other or not. Each of them should 
simultaneously decide which one of his strategies to follow (without knowing the choice of 
the other). Their choices determine their gain: If they both confess, each gets 10 years in 
prison , but if Al (resp., Bob) confesses and Bob (resp., Al) does not, Bob (resp., Al) gets 20 
and Al (resp., Bob) goes free. Finally, if they both do not confess they both get 1 year in 
prison.  
 
 
 
 Al 
Confess Don’t Confess 
Bob Confess 10, 10 0, 20 
Don’t Confess 20, 0 1, 1 
Table 1. The Prisoners’ Dilemma game. 
 
Table 1 shows the players, the strategies and their payoffs (gain) for each of their strategy 
selections. Each prisoner can choose among one of the two strategies. In effect, Al chooses a 
column and Bob chooses a row. The two numbers in each cell tell the outcome for the two 
prisoners when the corresponding pair of strategies is chosen. The number to the left of the 
comma tells the payoff to the person who chooses the rows (Bob) while the number to the 
right of the column tells the payoff to the person who chooses the columns (Al). Thus 
(reading down the first column) if they both confess, each gets 10 years, but if Al confesses 
and Bob does not, Bob gets 20 and Al goes free.  
 
Consider the following pair of strategies (profile) of the two players (confess, confess) 
corresponding to the strategy of Al and Bob respectively. Concerning Al, he gets 10 years in 
prison if he adopts this strategy, while he would get 20 years if he would not confess. 
Therefore his choice to confess is best for him. But the same reasoning holds also for Bob. 
Thus, the profile (confess, confess) consists best response strategies for all players of the game. 
This constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game. Since all players use a single strategy in 
this profile, it is called pure profile.  
 
Finding Nash equilibrium in this game seems to be not a difficult task. But in general games, 
there are more than two players involved with much more complicate payoff functions. This 
results to a significant increase of the difficulty to find Nash equilibrium. In particular, there 
are significant hardness results in finding pure Nash equilibria [FPT04], pointing to a whole 
complexity class (the PLS complexity class) which includes such searching tasks.  
 
With regards to our approach to network security evaluation, a game is represented by a 
number of attackers and defenders that both aim to maximize their utility on the network, 
the former by maliciously degrading its performance and the latter by protecting it against 
attacks.  
 
3. The Method 
Assessing network security NFR is not a trivial task. An increasingly popular approach is to 
express this problem in the form of a game between attacker and defenders [AB04, B99, 
W08]. The former correspond to malicious software and the latter to defence software. When 
the designer starts thinking like an attacker, in essence he/she engages in a game with the 
attacker. Finding and evaluating equilibriums between attackers and defenders' strategies 
provide the mechanism to assess network's security. Therefore, this critical information can 
be provided during the design phase of a prospective network and hence, enable the 
designer to optimise network features accordingly. 
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Game Theory models players with potentially different goals (utility functions or payoffs), 
that participate under a common setting with well prescribed interactions (strategies), e.g. 
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is defined as the condition of a system in which competing influences are balanced.  
 
2.1 Fundamental Components of Game Theory 
The fundamental component of game theory is the notion of a game, expressed in normal 
form as G=( M, A, {ui}), where G is a particular game, M is a finite set of players (decision 
makers) {1,2,…,m}, Ai is the set of actions available to player i, A = A1  A2   Am is the 
action space, and {ui} ={ u1 , u2 , ui , um } is the set of objective functions that the players wish 
to maximize. For every player i, the objective function, ui, is a function of the particular 
action chosen by player i, ai, and the particular actions chosen by all of the other players in 
the game, a-i.  
 
A profile or strategy of a game σ is defined as the a setting of its players in term of possible 
actions or the probability distribution on a set of actions for each player of the game in 
setting σ. The action of player i  M is denoted by σi, where σi  Ai.  
 
The core concept of Game Theory is the notion of equilibrium that is defined as the 
condition of a system in which competing influences are balanced, i.e. steady-state 
conditions. More informally, in any game, a profile σ is a Nash equilibrium [Nash50, Nash51] 
if in σ no player would unilaterally choose to deviate from his chosen action as this would 
diminish his payoff. Intuitively speaking, Nash equilibria model well stables states of a 
network, since if the network reaches such a configuration, most probably it would remain 
in the same configuration, since none of the involving entities has a motivation to change his 
status in order to be more satisfied. Thus, identifying Nash equilibria configuration of a 
network and evaluating them has been the main approach in order to analyze, evaluate 
networks performance [ACY05, ADTW03 , CK05, KP99, MMP08, RT02].  
 
Summing up, Game Theory and its various concepts of equilibrium provide a rich 
framework for modeling the behavior of selfish agents in distributed or networked 
environments. Moreover, it offers mechanisms to achieve efficient and desirable global 
outcomes given the selfish behavior of agents.  
 
2.2. An Example Game: The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma [O94] game has two players (the prisoners): Bob and Al. Each of 
them has two possible strategies: to confess the other or not. Each of them should 
simultaneously decide which one of his strategies to follow (without knowing the choice of 
the other). Their choices determine their gain: If they both confess, each gets 10 years in 
prison , but if Al (resp., Bob) confesses and Bob (resp., Al) does not, Bob (resp., Al) gets 20 
and Al (resp., Bob) goes free. Finally, if they both do not confess they both get 1 year in 
prison.  
 
 
 
 Al 
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Bob Confess 10, 10 0, 20 
Don’t Confess 20, 0 1, 1 
Table 1. The Prisoners’ Dilemma game. 
 
Table 1 shows the players, the strategies and their payoffs (gain) for each of their strategy 
selections. Each prisoner can choose among one of the two strategies. In effect, Al chooses a 
column and Bob chooses a row. The two numbers in each cell tell the outcome for the two 
prisoners when the corresponding pair of strategies is chosen. The number to the left of the 
comma tells the payoff to the person who chooses the rows (Bob) while the number to the 
right of the column tells the payoff to the person who chooses the columns (Al). Thus 
(reading down the first column) if they both confess, each gets 10 years, but if Al confesses 
and Bob does not, Bob gets 20 and Al goes free.  
 
Consider the following pair of strategies (profile) of the two players (confess, confess) 
corresponding to the strategy of Al and Bob respectively. Concerning Al, he gets 10 years in 
prison if he adopts this strategy, while he would get 20 years if he would not confess. 
Therefore his choice to confess is best for him. But the same reasoning holds also for Bob. 
Thus, the profile (confess, confess) consists best response strategies for all players of the game. 
This constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game. Since all players use a single strategy in 
this profile, it is called pure profile.  
 
Finding Nash equilibrium in this game seems to be not a difficult task. But in general games, 
there are more than two players involved with much more complicate payoff functions. This 
results to a significant increase of the difficulty to find Nash equilibrium. In particular, there 
are significant hardness results in finding pure Nash equilibria [FPT04], pointing to a whole 
complexity class (the PLS complexity class) which includes such searching tasks.  
 
With regards to our approach to network security evaluation, a game is represented by a 
number of attackers and defenders that both aim to maximize their utility on the network, 
the former by maliciously degrading its performance and the latter by protecting it against 
attacks.  
 
3. The Method 
Assessing network security NFR is not a trivial task. An increasingly popular approach is to 
express this problem in the form of a game between attacker and defenders [AB04, B99, 
W08]. The former correspond to malicious software and the latter to defence software. When 
the designer starts thinking like an attacker, in essence he/she engages in a game with the 
attacker. Finding and evaluating equilibriums between attackers and defenders' strategies 
provide the mechanism to assess network's security. Therefore, this critical information can 
be provided during the design phase of a prospective network and hence, enable the 
designer to optimise network features accordingly. 
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The approach described in here is based on identifying Nash equilibria between attacker 
and defender strategies and in this way provide the means to assess the security level of 
prospective networks. These estimates can be subsequently used to validate security. 
 
However, to validate a prospective network security NFR early in the design phase, 
prerequisite capturing its behaviour for all possible types of assaults. These combinations 
however, constitute a large number of possible test scenarios. Therefore, to evaluate the 
security performance of a prospective network we need to assess it against each of these 
possible test scenarios. Scenarios became a popular method for validating NFR [AS02, 
Car00] where each corresponds to a set of situations that might occur during the operation 
of a system. Application of scenarios in requirements validation has been performed by a 
number of researchers  [AG05, AS02, AD93, ZJ00]. However, the main problem in 
requirements validation through scenarios is the specification of an adequate number of test 
cases. This however is a tedious and time consuming task. On the other hand, automated 
support for the scenario generation proved to be a vexed problem due to the exponentially 
large set of possible variations that needs to be examined [AG05] for the NFR to be 
guaranteed. 
 
An approach that makes this problem tractable is described in here and is based on the 
application of game-theoretic analysis. In particular, we manage to reduce the number of 
scenarios needed to validate the NFRs by investigating only stable network states 
(configurations). This method is of polynomial time complexity compared to the size of the 
proposed network. Stable configurations describe the most likely states that a network could 
reside. Thus, by assessing security NFR in such states, we ensure the validity of the NFR 
almost always. Such states are very well captured through Nash equilibria profiles of the 
resulting game. Thus, we only utilize Nash equilibria in order to assess network security.  
 
Our approach is composed of the following steps: 
 
1) Functional and non-functional security requirement specification: Initially the network 
designer specifies quantitatively the required level of security of the future network as a 
percentage value. Moreover, the designer explicitly specifies the functional specification 
of the network in terms of security software capabilities and topology coverage. 
2) Modeling of the functional security and network requirements: Model functional 
security requirement in the prospective network as a game played on a graph. In 
particular, we represent the network's topology using a graph and adopt a security 
game introduced in [MPPS05c]. According to this approach, the security threats and the 
potential defence mechanisms are realized by a set of confronting players on a graphical 
game.  
3) Validation of the non-functional security requirement: We utilize the Nash equilibria 
identified and evaluated in [MPPS05c] to measure the security guarantee in the 
prospective network for both approaches. These represent a reduced set of test 
scenarios to be evaluated. Since Nash equilibria model well the stable configurations of 
the network, we ensure the validity of the NFR in the most probable states of the 
network. Evaluating of the Nash equilibria of the resulting game [MPPS05c] provides a 
novel validation method of the security NFR of prospective networks. 
 
 
3.1. Case-study  
We next illustrate the application of our method in an example network. The method is 
applicable in any network that fulfills the functional requirements specified a priori. The 
corresponding security NFR is initially defined as a percentage of the required level of 
security. Finding equilibria through Game Theory enables the designer to identify “stable” 
network configurations and subsequently evaluate whether these can archive the required 
level of security. The security NFR is satisfied if the assessed security meets the initial 
requirement. Therefore, the core problem in validating security is to firstly provide the 
means to assess it. 
 
Our approach is based on the notion of scenarios [Car00], each describing possible 
configurations of attackers and defenders on the network. The use of Game Theory enables 
us to reduce the complexity of this process by analysing only scenarios that both attackers 
and the defender would choose given that they act rationally-they act in a way that aims to 
maximizes their benefit. Through game-theoretic analysis, strategies of both attackers and 
defenders on a network are modeled accordingly to assess the network’s security.  
 
Next we illustrate the application of the method for a network characterized by a set of 
functional requirements.  
 
3.1.1. Functional Security Requirement Specification 
A precondition for the method is that the network is of type “hit-all”. This means that the 
network N consists of an arbitrary number of nodes, n and a set of communication links E 
between the nodes of the network. Moreover, there exists a subset of the links EE such 
that each node  of the network is ”hit” (incident) to exactly one link of the set E. Note that a 
network with this property can be build and identified (that has fulfills the property) in 
polynomial time [LP86] (such a set is called a Perfect Matching of the network). We call such 
a network a hit-all network. For example, in the network of Figure 1, node 1 is hit by links 
e1, e2 and e3 shown with thick lines. Moreover, the thick links constitutes a hit-all set for that 
network.  
 Fig. 1. An example of a network with a hit all set of links shown with thick lines. 
 
We specify network security specification using a common process utilized in critical systems 
specifications [S05]. The process consists of the following components:  
 
1. Asset identification: The assets of the network are the nodes of the network. In the 
most general case, all nodes are of the same importance. A node is considered protected 
or secure if a security software is installed on that node. Otherwise it is considered 
vulnerable to attacks.  
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The approach described in here is based on identifying Nash equilibria between attacker 
and defender strategies and in this way provide the means to assess the security level of 
prospective networks. These estimates can be subsequently used to validate security. 
 
However, to validate a prospective network security NFR early in the design phase, 
prerequisite capturing its behaviour for all possible types of assaults. These combinations 
however, constitute a large number of possible test scenarios. Therefore, to evaluate the 
security performance of a prospective network we need to assess it against each of these 
possible test scenarios. Scenarios became a popular method for validating NFR [AS02, 
Car00] where each corresponds to a set of situations that might occur during the operation 
of a system. Application of scenarios in requirements validation has been performed by a 
number of researchers  [AG05, AS02, AD93, ZJ00]. However, the main problem in 
requirements validation through scenarios is the specification of an adequate number of test 
cases. This however is a tedious and time consuming task. On the other hand, automated 
support for the scenario generation proved to be a vexed problem due to the exponentially 
large set of possible variations that needs to be examined [AG05] for the NFR to be 
guaranteed. 
 
An approach that makes this problem tractable is described in here and is based on the 
application of game-theoretic analysis. In particular, we manage to reduce the number of 
scenarios needed to validate the NFRs by investigating only stable network states 
(configurations). This method is of polynomial time complexity compared to the size of the 
proposed network. Stable configurations describe the most likely states that a network could 
reside. Thus, by assessing security NFR in such states, we ensure the validity of the NFR 
almost always. Such states are very well captured through Nash equilibria profiles of the 
resulting game. Thus, we only utilize Nash equilibria in order to assess network security.  
 
Our approach is composed of the following steps: 
 
1) Functional and non-functional security requirement specification: Initially the network 
designer specifies quantitatively the required level of security of the future network as a 
percentage value. Moreover, the designer explicitly specifies the functional specification 
of the network in terms of security software capabilities and topology coverage. 
2) Modeling of the functional security and network requirements: Model functional 
security requirement in the prospective network as a game played on a graph. In 
particular, we represent the network's topology using a graph and adopt a security 
game introduced in [MPPS05c]. According to this approach, the security threats and the 
potential defence mechanisms are realized by a set of confronting players on a graphical 
game.  
3) Validation of the non-functional security requirement: We utilize the Nash equilibria 
identified and evaluated in [MPPS05c] to measure the security guarantee in the 
prospective network for both approaches. These represent a reduced set of test 
scenarios to be evaluated. Since Nash equilibria model well the stable configurations of 
the network, we ensure the validity of the NFR in the most probable states of the 
network. Evaluating of the Nash equilibria of the resulting game [MPPS05c] provides a 
novel validation method of the security NFR of prospective networks. 
 
 
3.1. Case-study  
We next illustrate the application of our method in an example network. The method is 
applicable in any network that fulfills the functional requirements specified a priori. The 
corresponding security NFR is initially defined as a percentage of the required level of 
security. Finding equilibria through Game Theory enables the designer to identify “stable” 
network configurations and subsequently evaluate whether these can archive the required 
level of security. The security NFR is satisfied if the assessed security meets the initial 
requirement. Therefore, the core problem in validating security is to firstly provide the 
means to assess it. 
 
Our approach is based on the notion of scenarios [Car00], each describing possible 
configurations of attackers and defenders on the network. The use of Game Theory enables 
us to reduce the complexity of this process by analysing only scenarios that both attackers 
and the defender would choose given that they act rationally-they act in a way that aims to 
maximizes their benefit. Through game-theoretic analysis, strategies of both attackers and 
defenders on a network are modeled accordingly to assess the network’s security.  
 
Next we illustrate the application of the method for a network characterized by a set of 
functional requirements.  
 
3.1.1. Functional Security Requirement Specification 
A precondition for the method is that the network is of type “hit-all”. This means that the 
network N consists of an arbitrary number of nodes, n and a set of communication links E 
between the nodes of the network. Moreover, there exists a subset of the links EE such 
that each node  of the network is ”hit” (incident) to exactly one link of the set E. Note that a 
network with this property can be build and identified (that has fulfills the property) in 
polynomial time [LP86] (such a set is called a Perfect Matching of the network). We call such 
a network a hit-all network. For example, in the network of Figure 1, node 1 is hit by links 
e1, e2 and e3 shown with thick lines. Moreover, the thick links constitutes a hit-all set for that 
network.  
 Fig. 1. An example of a network with a hit all set of links shown with thick lines. 
 
We specify network security specification using a common process utilized in critical systems 
specifications [S05]. The process consists of the following components:  
 
1. Asset identification: The assets of the network are the nodes of the network. In the 
most general case, all nodes are of the same importance. A node is considered protected 
or secure if a security software is installed on that node. Otherwise it is considered 
vulnerable to attacks.  
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2. Threat analysis and assignment: The prospective network may witnessed threats, 
such as viruses, Trojan horses and eavesdroppers [FAGY00] which are described as 
attacks that target the nodes of the network. At any time there is a maximum number of 
attackers, , that may be present in the network. Each of them damages nodes that are 
not protected. In the most general case, we have no information on the distribution of 
the attacks on the nodes of the network. So, we assume that attacks will follow a 
uniform distribution [T01], which is quite common in such cases. So, we assume that 
each attacker decides to attack or not a node of the network with the same probability. 
We call such attacks uniform attacks.  
 
3. Technology analysis: One major security mechanism for protecting network attacks 
are the firewalls, that we refer to as defenders. Furthermore, in distributed firewalls [17] 
the network that is protected includes the links spanned by the nodes that participate in 
the distribution of the defenders. However, due to financial costs (e.g., the prohibitive 
cost of purchasing global security software) or from performance bottlenecks (e.g., the 
reduced usage of the protected part of the network) distributed mechanisms are only 
able to clean a limited part of the network. There are two possibilities with regards to 
the functional specification of the protection mechanism:  
(a) The simplest case is when the security mechanism resides on a single link 
of the network and hence protects the two nodes that the link connects. 
We call this specification as single-edge–protection specification.  
In this case we assume that the prospective network is supported by a single 
security software, denoted as d, which is able to clean a single link between two 
nodes from possible attackers at the endpoints of that link.  
The distribution of defenders on the network’s nodes exploits the topological 
property of the network as presented in the specification. That is, there is a set 
of links E in the network such that any node is hit by (exactly) one link of that 
set. In particular, we assume defense mechanism chooses one link among that 
set E with the same probability that is uniformly at random. We call this 
placement of the defense mechanism as uniform-hit-all.  
 
(b) In the general case when the security mechanism covers a set of links k, 
where k >1 but k<E. We call this specification as multiple-edge–protection 
specification.  
So, in this case we assume that the network is supported by a security 
mechanism, denoted by dk, which is able to clean a set k of links between two 
nodes from possible attackers at the endpoints of any link in the set. 
In this case, there is a set of links E in the network such that any node is hit by 
(exactly) one link of that set. It is assumed that the defense mechanism is 
placed on a set of k links among the set E. We call this placement of the 
defense mechanism as k-edges-hit-all.  
  
In this work we consider both uniform-hit-all and k-edges-hit-all that correspond to single-
edge–protection and multiple-edge–protection accordingly security specification. 
 
 
3.1.2. Modelling scenarios using Security and Network properties 
This activity aims to assess the security NFR of the prospective network using a number of 
scenarios. A game theoretical model of the proposed network is presented and subsequently 
the necessary tools and notions that enable its security quantification are explained.  
 
We model both network and security specifications presented in section 3.1.1. using two 
graph-theoretic games introduced and investigated in [MPPS05c, MPPS05b, MMPPS06]. The 
game is played on a graph G representing the network N. The players of the game are of two 
kinds: the attackers players and the defender players, representing the attacks and the security 
software of the network. The attackers play on the vertices of the graph, representing the 
nodes of the network. We consider two scenarios for the defenders: 
 
a) The defender plays on the edges of the graph, representing the links of the network. 
This case models the single-edge–protection security specification and calls this 
model single-edge-protection game.  
 
b) The defender plays on sets of k edges of the graph, representing sets of links of the 
network. This case models the multiple-edge–protection security specification and 
calls this model k-edges-protection game. 
 
3.1.2.1 Network Configurations 
 
A network configuration s models the location (nodes) of attackers and defense mechanism 
(link or a set of links) on the network. The positioning of attackers and defenders may 
follow a probability distribution. That is, each attacker can target more than one node 
according to some probability distribution and similarly, the defense mechanism may 
protect more than one link according to another probability distribution. In such a case, 
have a mixed configuration of s. Otherwise, the configuration is said to be pure; one attacker 
on one node and the sole defender on one link. This constitutes another property of the 
scenario specification. 
 
Example of the Single-edge-protection game. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a mixed configuration for an example network, N consisting of 8 nodes 
(n=8). It can be seen that the network is a hit-all type. We assume that there exists 3 different 
attackers (=3). According to the threat analysis of the security specification, the attacks are 
uniform; and hence, the probability of an attacker assaulting any node of the network is 
equal to 1/n which is equal to 1/8. In the Figure, attacker i is indicated by Xi. 
 
Next, in the technology analysis of the security specification we designate that the security 
software mechanism is a single-edge–protection. Hence, modeled using the single-edge-
protection game. Moreover, according to the security specifications, the security mechanism 
uses a uniform-hit-all probability distribution on a set of links E. Recall that E is such that 
any node of the network is hit by (exactly) one link of that set. So, the defender chooses each 
links of this set with probability 1/|E'|= 1/4. In Figure 2, the links, as well as their 
corresponding visiting probabilities, are indicated by Y and thick lines. 
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2. Threat analysis and assignment: The prospective network may witnessed threats, 
such as viruses, Trojan horses and eavesdroppers [FAGY00] which are described as 
attacks that target the nodes of the network. At any time there is a maximum number of 
attackers, , that may be present in the network. Each of them damages nodes that are 
not protected. In the most general case, we have no information on the distribution of 
the attacks on the nodes of the network. So, we assume that attacks will follow a 
uniform distribution [T01], which is quite common in such cases. So, we assume that 
each attacker decides to attack or not a node of the network with the same probability. 
We call such attacks uniform attacks.  
 
3. Technology analysis: One major security mechanism for protecting network attacks 
are the firewalls, that we refer to as defenders. Furthermore, in distributed firewalls [17] 
the network that is protected includes the links spanned by the nodes that participate in 
the distribution of the defenders. However, due to financial costs (e.g., the prohibitive 
cost of purchasing global security software) or from performance bottlenecks (e.g., the 
reduced usage of the protected part of the network) distributed mechanisms are only 
able to clean a limited part of the network. There are two possibilities with regards to 
the functional specification of the protection mechanism:  
(a) The simplest case is when the security mechanism resides on a single link 
of the network and hence protects the two nodes that the link connects. 
We call this specification as single-edge–protection specification.  
In this case we assume that the prospective network is supported by a single 
security software, denoted as d, which is able to clean a single link between two 
nodes from possible attackers at the endpoints of that link.  
The distribution of defenders on the network’s nodes exploits the topological 
property of the network as presented in the specification. That is, there is a set 
of links E in the network such that any node is hit by (exactly) one link of that 
set. In particular, we assume defense mechanism chooses one link among that 
set E with the same probability that is uniformly at random. We call this 
placement of the defense mechanism as uniform-hit-all.  
 
(b) In the general case when the security mechanism covers a set of links k, 
where k >1 but k<E. We call this specification as multiple-edge–protection 
specification.  
So, in this case we assume that the network is supported by a security 
mechanism, denoted by dk, which is able to clean a set k of links between two 
nodes from possible attackers at the endpoints of any link in the set. 
In this case, there is a set of links E in the network such that any node is hit by 
(exactly) one link of that set. It is assumed that the defense mechanism is 
placed on a set of k links among the set E. We call this placement of the 
defense mechanism as k-edges-hit-all.  
  
In this work we consider both uniform-hit-all and k-edges-hit-all that correspond to single-
edge–protection and multiple-edge–protection accordingly security specification. 
 
 
3.1.2. Modelling scenarios using Security and Network properties 
This activity aims to assess the security NFR of the prospective network using a number of 
scenarios. A game theoretical model of the proposed network is presented and subsequently 
the necessary tools and notions that enable its security quantification are explained.  
 
We model both network and security specifications presented in section 3.1.1. using two 
graph-theoretic games introduced and investigated in [MPPS05c, MPPS05b, MMPPS06]. The 
game is played on a graph G representing the network N. The players of the game are of two 
kinds: the attackers players and the defender players, representing the attacks and the security 
software of the network. The attackers play on the vertices of the graph, representing the 
nodes of the network. We consider two scenarios for the defenders: 
 
a) The defender plays on the edges of the graph, representing the links of the network. 
This case models the single-edge–protection security specification and calls this 
model single-edge-protection game.  
 
b) The defender plays on sets of k edges of the graph, representing sets of links of the 
network. This case models the multiple-edge–protection security specification and 
calls this model k-edges-protection game. 
 
3.1.2.1 Network Configurations 
 
A network configuration s models the location (nodes) of attackers and defense mechanism 
(link or a set of links) on the network. The positioning of attackers and defenders may 
follow a probability distribution. That is, each attacker can target more than one node 
according to some probability distribution and similarly, the defense mechanism may 
protect more than one link according to another probability distribution. In such a case, 
have a mixed configuration of s. Otherwise, the configuration is said to be pure; one attacker 
on one node and the sole defender on one link. This constitutes another property of the 
scenario specification. 
 
Example of the Single-edge-protection game. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a mixed configuration for an example network, N consisting of 8 nodes 
(n=8). It can be seen that the network is a hit-all type. We assume that there exists 3 different 
attackers (=3). According to the threat analysis of the security specification, the attacks are 
uniform; and hence, the probability of an attacker assaulting any node of the network is 
equal to 1/n which is equal to 1/8. In the Figure, attacker i is indicated by Xi. 
 
Next, in the technology analysis of the security specification we designate that the security 
software mechanism is a single-edge–protection. Hence, modeled using the single-edge-
protection game. Moreover, according to the security specifications, the security mechanism 
uses a uniform-hit-all probability distribution on a set of links E. Recall that E is such that 
any node of the network is hit by (exactly) one link of that set. So, the defender chooses each 
links of this set with probability 1/|E'|= 1/4. In Figure 2, the links, as well as their 
corresponding visiting probabilities, are indicated by Y and thick lines. 
www.intechopen.com
Management and Services 50
 
 Fig. 2. An example of a network configuration for the Single-edge-protection game. We 
assume that there exists 3 different attackers (=3). Each attacker is indicated by X. Each 
attacker targets any node of the network with probability 1/8. The security software chooses 
among a subset of links E' to clean them from possible attacks, uniformly at random. The 
links consisting the set E', and their corresponding visiting probabilities, are indicated by Y 
in thick lines. So, each link in the set is visited by the security software with probability 1/4. 
The assessed security level of this scenario is equal to 25%. 
  
Example of the k-edges-protection game. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates a network configuration for the same sample network of Figure 2 and the 
same scenario assumptions for the attackers. The scenario specification for the security 
software mechanism is defined as a multiple-edge–protection. Hence, modeled in a k-edge-
protection game. Here, we assume that k=n/2. Moreover, according to the security 
specifications, the set of edges E’, that the defense mechanism can clean simultaneously, 
constitute a k-edges-hit-all set. That is, any node of the network is hit by (exactly) one link of 
the set E. In Figure 3, the links of the set E’ are indicated by thick lines. 
 
 Fig. 3. An example of a network configuration for the k-edges-protection game. In this case 
the defense mechanism can clean k links at the same time; that is k=n/2. Also, the defense 
mechanism is placed on a set of links E’ such that the set is a k-edges-hit-all indicated with 
thick lines. The assessed security level of this scenario is equal to 100%. 
 
 
3.1.3. Validation of the Non-functional Security Requirement 
 
3.1.3.1 A Game-Theoretic Security Measurement 
To evaluate network security it is necessary to assess the security level of an arbitrary profile 
(configuration) of the defined game of the prospective network similarly with [MPPS05c, 
MPPS05b, GMPPS06]. Therefore, consider a pure network configuration s. Let sd be the 
edges defended by the security software. For each attacker i[], let si be the node in which 
the attacker strikes. We say that the attacker i is killed by the security mechanism if the node 
si is one of the two endpoints of the link sd being defended by the security software. Then, 
the defense ratio [MMPPS06] of the configuration s, denoted by rs is defined to be as follows, 
when given as a percentage:  
 
 .100in  killed attackers ofnumber  a
srs      (1) 
For a mixed network configuration, the defense ratio [MMPPS06] of the configuration, rs is 
defined as:  
 .100in  killed attackers ofnumber  expected  a
srs           (2) 
 
From the above, the optimal defense ratio of a network equals to 100 if the security software 
manages to kill all attackers. In such a case we specify that the network configuration 
obtains 100 security level. The larger the value of rs the greater the security level obtained.  
Through this approach, we assess the security level of perspective networks by only 
examining stable configurations and hence limited scenarios. Given that, whenever the 
network reaches a stable a configuration it tents to remain in that configuration, highlights 
the significance of evaluating scenarios that emerge from this to assess its security NFR. This 
is because in such configurations no single player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate 
from its current strategy. So, such configurations constitute the most probable states of the 
network and hence we use these to define the test scenarios based on which to assess 
security. Therefore, we escape from the NP-hard problem of having to assess each possible 
configuration or scenario. We identify such stable configurations evaluate the network 
security on them. Thus, this measurement constitutes a representative assessment of the 
security level of prospective networks.  
 
Considering that the network designer wishes to achieve a security level of 90%, the 
following procedure is used to assess the security level for different network configurations. 
The main constrain of the approach is that it limits its scope to hit-all type networks. 
 
Initially, we identify stable configurations resulting from the specifications by the Nash 
equilibria found in the game of [MMPPS06]. Thus, in order to evaluate network security we 
evaluate the Nash equilibria of the game of [MPPS05c, MPPS05b]. Indeed they showed a 
result which is interpreted in our terms as follows:  
 
Theorem 1. [MMPPS06] Consider a network N with n nodes such that the network and security 
and functional and non-functional specifications of Section 3.1.1 (case (a) of Technology analysis of 
Section 3.1.1) are satisfied. Then the network contains a stable configuration (i.e. a mixed Nash 
equilibrium) s where the expected number of attackers killed is 2/n. So, the defense ratio here is :  
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among a subset of links E' to clean them from possible attacks, uniformly at random. The 
links consisting the set E', and their corresponding visiting probabilities, are indicated by Y 
in thick lines. So, each link in the set is visited by the security software with probability 1/4. 
The assessed security level of this scenario is equal to 25%. 
  
Example of the k-edges-protection game. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates a network configuration for the same sample network of Figure 2 and the 
same scenario assumptions for the attackers. The scenario specification for the security 
software mechanism is defined as a multiple-edge–protection. Hence, modeled in a k-edge-
protection game. Here, we assume that k=n/2. Moreover, according to the security 
specifications, the set of edges E’, that the defense mechanism can clean simultaneously, 
constitute a k-edges-hit-all set. That is, any node of the network is hit by (exactly) one link of 
the set E. In Figure 3, the links of the set E’ are indicated by thick lines. 
 
 Fig. 3. An example of a network configuration for the k-edges-protection game. In this case 
the defense mechanism can clean k links at the same time; that is k=n/2. Also, the defense 
mechanism is placed on a set of links E’ such that the set is a k-edges-hit-all indicated with 
thick lines. The assessed security level of this scenario is equal to 100%. 
 
 
3.1.3. Validation of the Non-functional Security Requirement 
 
3.1.3.1 A Game-Theoretic Security Measurement 
To evaluate network security it is necessary to assess the security level of an arbitrary profile 
(configuration) of the defined game of the prospective network similarly with [MPPS05c, 
MPPS05b, GMPPS06]. Therefore, consider a pure network configuration s. Let sd be the 
edges defended by the security software. For each attacker i[], let si be the node in which 
the attacker strikes. We say that the attacker i is killed by the security mechanism if the node 
si is one of the two endpoints of the link sd being defended by the security software. Then, 
the defense ratio [MMPPS06] of the configuration s, denoted by rs is defined to be as follows, 
when given as a percentage:  
 
 .100in  killed attackers ofnumber  a
srs      (1) 
For a mixed network configuration, the defense ratio [MMPPS06] of the configuration, rs is 
defined as:  
 .100in  killed attackers ofnumber  expected  a
srs           (2) 
 
From the above, the optimal defense ratio of a network equals to 100 if the security software 
manages to kill all attackers. In such a case we specify that the network configuration 
obtains 100 security level. The larger the value of rs the greater the security level obtained.  
Through this approach, we assess the security level of perspective networks by only 
examining stable configurations and hence limited scenarios. Given that, whenever the 
network reaches a stable a configuration it tents to remain in that configuration, highlights 
the significance of evaluating scenarios that emerge from this to assess its security NFR. This 
is because in such configurations no single player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate 
from its current strategy. So, such configurations constitute the most probable states of the 
network and hence we use these to define the test scenarios based on which to assess 
security. Therefore, we escape from the NP-hard problem of having to assess each possible 
configuration or scenario. We identify such stable configurations evaluate the network 
security on them. Thus, this measurement constitutes a representative assessment of the 
security level of prospective networks.  
 
Considering that the network designer wishes to achieve a security level of 90%, the 
following procedure is used to assess the security level for different network configurations. 
The main constrain of the approach is that it limits its scope to hit-all type networks. 
 
Initially, we identify stable configurations resulting from the specifications by the Nash 
equilibria found in the game of [MMPPS06]. Thus, in order to evaluate network security we 
evaluate the Nash equilibria of the game of [MPPS05c, MPPS05b]. Indeed they showed a 
result which is interpreted in our terms as follows:  
 
Theorem 1. [MMPPS06] Consider a network N with n nodes such that the network and security 
and functional and non-functional specifications of Section 3.1.1 (case (a) of Technology analysis of 
Section 3.1.1) are satisfied. Then the network contains a stable configuration (i.e. a mixed Nash 
equilibrium) s where the expected number of attackers killed is 2/n. So, the defense ratio here is :  
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 1002  nrs    (3) 
 
The result combined with equation (1) above implies that the network of Figure 1 has 
security level equal to 2/n100=2/8100=25, since n=8. This designates that the level of 
security is 25 given the functional requirements specified in configuration s. This 
assessment however indicates that the initial NFR specified by the designer is not satisfied 
using the prescribed functional requirements of the network as is. Hence, the network 
specification needs to be revised and the security NFR revalidated, prior to implementation.  
 
We also use the following result:  
 
Theorem 2. [GMPPS06] Consider a network N with n nodes such that the network and security 
and functional and non-functional requirements given in section 3.1 (b) are satisfied and k=n/2. Then 
the network contains a stable configuration (i.e. a Nash equilibrium) s where all attackers are killed. 
So, the defense ratio is  
 100100  a
ars     (4) 
 
The result implies that the network of Figure 2 has security level equal to 100 (recall that 
k=n/2 here) given the functional requirements specified in configuration s. This assessment 
indicates that the NFR specified by the designer a priori is now satisfied using the 
prescribed functional requirements of the network.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Security requirements validation is traditionally performed through security-specific testing. 
Ideally, validation should be performed on all possible network conditions expressed by test 
scenarios. However, examining all possible scenarios [AD93, AS02] to validate security 
requirement early in the design phase of a prospective network, constitutes a highly complex 
and sometimes infeasible task. In this work we manage to accomplish this process in only 
polynomial time. This is achieved by considering only stable configurations of the system, that 
we model using Nash equilibria. This yields in a limited set of test scenarios that guarantee the 
assessment of network’s security level. In this context, the method presented in this paper 
constitutes a novelty in validating security NFR through game theory. 
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 1002  nrs    (3) 
 
The result combined with equation (1) above implies that the network of Figure 1 has 
security level equal to 2/n100=2/8100=25, since n=8. This designates that the level of 
security is 25 given the functional requirements specified in configuration s. This 
assessment however indicates that the initial NFR specified by the designer is not satisfied 
using the prescribed functional requirements of the network as is. Hence, the network 
specification needs to be revised and the security NFR revalidated, prior to implementation.  
 
We also use the following result:  
 
Theorem 2. [GMPPS06] Consider a network N with n nodes such that the network and security 
and functional and non-functional requirements given in section 3.1 (b) are satisfied and k=n/2. Then 
the network contains a stable configuration (i.e. a Nash equilibrium) s where all attackers are killed. 
So, the defense ratio is  
 100100  a
ars     (4) 
 
The result implies that the network of Figure 2 has security level equal to 100 (recall that 
k=n/2 here) given the functional requirements specified in configuration s. This assessment 
indicates that the NFR specified by the designer a priori is now satisfied using the 
prescribed functional requirements of the network.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Security requirements validation is traditionally performed through security-specific testing. 
Ideally, validation should be performed on all possible network conditions expressed by test 
scenarios. However, examining all possible scenarios [AD93, AS02] to validate security 
requirement early in the design phase of a prospective network, constitutes a highly complex 
and sometimes infeasible task. In this work we manage to accomplish this process in only 
polynomial time. This is achieved by considering only stable configurations of the system, that 
we model using Nash equilibria. This yields in a limited set of test scenarios that guarantee the 
assessment of network’s security level. In this context, the method presented in this paper 
constitutes a novelty in validating security NFR through game theory. 
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